and neo-Hegelian philosophers (Wakeman, 1973 ). Mao's originality as a Marxist thinker has been attacked (Wittfogel, 1960) , defended (Schwartz, 1960) , and carefully qualified (Schram, 1967 (Schram, , 1971 ). An (Pfeffer, 1976) . A related, recurrent theme presents Mao as a &dquo;voluntarist&dquo; compared with an allegedly more &dquo;economic determinist&dquo; Marx. Mao, we are repeatedly told, displays &dquo;activistic and voluntaristic impulses&dquo; (Meisner, 1967: 266), a &dquo;Rousseauan-Jacobin voluntarism diffused through Marxism-Leninism&dquo; (Goldman, 1973: 246), and &dquo;extreme voluntarism&dquo; (Schram, 1969: 135) . Not surprisingly, the Great Leap Forward is described as &dquo;when Mao and his comrades indulged in the greatest orgy of voluntarist thinking in the history of the communist movement&dquo; (Schram, 1967: 160) . This type of &dquo;voluntarism&dquo; has at times been sug- [103] gested to be so extreme that it represents a break with &dquo;the very essence of Marxism&dquo; and is characteristic of &dquo;a revolution which has nothing in common with Marxism&dquo; (Schram and d'Encausse, 1969: 110, 112 [Schram, 1969: (Schram and ~d'Encausse, 1969: 108); and &dquo;voluntarism&dquo; and &dquo;an utterly deterministic force majeure&dquo; (Schram, 1967: 160 Holubnychy (1964; 1965) (Schram, 1967: 159-160), while Holubnychy, on the other hand, could only vent his wrath on Schram and the China field for being &dquo;purely&dquo; ideological (Holubnychy, 1965: 190 (Schram and d'Encausse, 1969: 110 (Schram and d'Encausse, 1969: 9-15 [108] determinist, but that &dquo; 'voluntarism' is by no means absent from Marx himself&dquo; (Schram, 1969: 135). Marx (Meisner, 1965: 168-169) . The Chinese may evoke the &dquo;deterministic formulas of Marx,&dquo; but this is only a smoke screen-Mao's conception clearly reflects a &dquo;lack of confidence in the determining forces of history&dquo; (Meisner, 1965: 168-169 (Schram, 1969: [Marx and Engels, 1942: 475] Engels not only laid out as a general, abstract proposition that elements in the superstructure strongly influence the economic base in producing social change, he also gave specific examples to illustrate his points. He explained that state power, merely one element of the superstructure, crucially shaped the development of the economic base in three basic ways-it could encourage production, channel it into certain directions, or, through misguided policies, obstruct economic progress, with disastrous effects on both state and, society (Marx and Engels, 1942: 481-482 ). This effect is accomplished through the use of another aspect of the superstructure-the state's laws and financial policies&dquo;tariffs, free trade, good or bad fiscal system&dquo; (Marx and Engels, 1942: 481-482). The &dquo;cringing servility&dquo; of the German petty bourgeoisie, and their deference to princes and nobles, for example, permitted a legal situation that accounted for the &dquo;miserable economic position&dquo; of the German principalities from 1640 to 1830 (Marx and Engels, 1942: 517; 1955: 442 (Marx, 1971: 225-226 (Marx and Engels, 1955: 399-400 (Marx and Engels, 1955: 402 (Marx and Engels, 1955: 399). Engels quite clearly felt that &dquo;Political, juridical, philo- [114] sophical, religious, literary, artistic, etc., (Marx, 1973: 100). This model of reciprocal interaction allows, indeed requires, the superstructure to influence the economic base-for the &dquo;mental&dquo; to affect the &dquo;material.&dquo; So under certain circumstances, for Marx, &dquo;theory, too, becomes a material force once it seizes the masses&dquo; (Marx, 1970: 137 (Marx, 1964: 9)-are replete with accounts of decisive political actions taken by governments, parties, and even indi-viduals, relatively independent of any immediate economic connection, in making history (Marx, 1964; Marx and Engels, 1968: 95-180 (Marx, 1967: 754-756 (Marx, 1967: 754-756). But not only did this superstructural system of financial laws have an influence on when and where capitalism developed, it also affected the pace of industrial growth. Marx felt that Great Britain's laws of protection and tariffs, coupled with the development of systems of national debt and taxation, was an artificial means of manufacturing manufacturers, of expropriating independent labourers, of capitalizing the national [116] means of production and subsistence, of forcibly abbreviating the transition from the medieval to the modern mode of production. [Marx, 1967: (Holubnychy, 1965: 187-188), he objected strenuously to the labeling of Mao as an "extreme voluntarist." Schram's (1967: 159-160) cavalier dismissal of Holubnychy's objections marked the end of this brief exchange, which never really developed into an intellectual debate, and attests to the seriousness with which alternative interpretations have ever been considered in the China field.
2. This position contradicts Meisner's earlier, correct realization that there is no rigid conception of stages of world history in Marx against which to measure Mao's voluntarism (Meisner, 1965: 166 
